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ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In order to correctly asses the current status of anti-
dumping law in South Africa, as well as to determine the 
role that it will play in the future, it is necessary to 
take its historical setting into account . This requires an 
investigation into the origins of South African anti-dumping 
law and the manner in which it was applied in the past.· In 
this regard the economic and political conditions which 
prevailed in the past are relevant as is the way in which 
these conditions have changed. 
As will become evident there has been much change regarding 
anti-dumping law in South Africa. This process of 
transition, concerning the status and role of anti-dumping 
law, must be recognised as forming the background when 
analysing the current position of anti-dumping law in South 
Africa. 
To determine a way forward for the law relating to dumping, 
in a manner that takes these economic and political changes 
accurately into account, and which is of a nature that is 
practically workable for South Africa, it is desirable to 
ref er to other legal systems and how these legal systems 
have used and developed their anti-dumping law. 
WHAT rs ANTI-DUMPING LAW? 
Anti-dumping law, in its current form, emerged out of 'The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' ( the GATT) . An 
investigation into anti-dumping law, therefore, clearly 
requires an understanding of the GATT as well the nature of 
South Africa's relationship with it. 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
The regulation of international trade, which started 
gradually after the Second World War, promoted a market 
economy; this means, for instance, liberalization of the 
movement of goods and prohibition of restrictions on 
competition by the market participants.I 
The GATT was formed in 1947, after the establishment of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by 
twenty-seven countries in order to advance free trade world-
wide through a continuing process of trade liberalisation. 
It is comprised of a set of multilaterally-agreed rules 
which are aimed at governing the trade policies of 
individual countries. "GATT membership currently extends to 
1 Van Houtte The Law of International Trade@ page 51 
109 countries, which between them account for over 90% of 
world trade."2 
Naturally there have not only been supporters .of the GATT, 
there have also been critics who "have come to view GATT as 
an institution primarily serving the interests of the 
developed economies to the detriment of developing 
countries."3 One of the major criticisms in this regard is 
that GATT has failed to adequately deal with the fundamental 
problems which are peculiar to developing countries and 
which are in serious need of attention. 
South Africa was one of the founding members of the GATT and 
has always participated in the various rounds of 
negotiations that the GATT has held. For various reasons, 
however, South Africa has not always been a disciplined 
member of the GATT. One of the significant factors that 
resulted in it not being a disciplined member is that, 
historically, South Africa was protectionist in nature and 
tended to pursue a policy of import replacement rather than 
pursue a policy of openness towards the international 
market. The use of sanctions against South Africa, by the 
international community, was another contributory factor 
which led to its isolation. A further factor, in this 
regard, was its balance of payment problems and the approach 
that was used in dealing with them. 
The early 1990' s saw drastic political changes for South 
Africa. These changes resulted in the decades of its 
isolation coming to an end. South Africa has once again 
become part of the international trading community and this 
reintroduction of South Africa, into the international 
trading community, has meant that South Africa has had to 
re-assess its international economic relations. Importantly 
this process of re-assessment has included a questioning of 
the role that South Africa should play within the GATT. 
The approach taken by South Africa towards the question of 
international trade, prior to the dramatic political changes 
that occurred, is apparent in Paragraph 1 of the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade's (the Board's) "Guide to the Policy and 
Procedure with regard to Action against Unfair International 
Trade Practices: Dumping, Subsidies and Other Forms of 
Disruptive Competition" ( the Guide) . This paragraph, . under 
the heading "Perspective", reads: 
"The export or threat of export of products from any 
country to the common area of the Southern African 
Customs Union (Customs Union) may disrupt the markets 
2 'The Uruguay Round: Implications for South Africa', Trade 
Monitoring Project, UCT - Number 1: February 1993 by 
Rashaad Cassim@ p 1 
3 ibid 
in the Customs Union, which could have a harmful 
effect on the economies of the Customs Union".4 
The wording used in this paragraph is clear evidence of the 
protectionist attitude taken by South Africa in considering 
the role of international trade in its economy. This 
attitude forms a stark contrast to the current attitude 
displayed in the National Economic Forum's Report.5 In this 
Report it is stated that: 
"It is generally accepted that international trade can 
contribute to the well-being and improved standard of 
living of all the countries engaged in such trade. For 
this reason the international community has, for a 
considerable time, endeavoured to improve 
international trade through a number of rounds of. 
negotiation as part of the GATT".6 
It would seem, therefore, that South Africa has decided in 
favour of participation in the international trading 
community and has accepted that GATT can play a positive 
role in this regard. From the statement by the NEF it is 
not clear whether any of the major criticisms that have been 
directed against the GATT have been taken into account. 
Whilst it is true that most of these criticisms have 
emanated from the member states that are considered to be 
'developing' states and South Africa can not altogether be 
considered to be a developing state it is also true that 
South Africa is not an entirely developed state. As a 
result, the critic isms levelled against the GATT should be 
seen to be of some interest for South Africa as they may 
well prove to be of some relevance. 
4 page 1 of the Guide 
5 "Anti-dumping and Countervailing and Safeguard Measures 
Investigation by the Trade and Industry Working Group 
of the National Economic Forum. At the end of 1994 the 
Trade and Industry Working Group of the NEF published a 
report on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures. 
The NEF was launched in October 1992 with organised 
business, organised labour and the Government as its 
principal participants. The NEF was established to 
provide a mechanism through which major economic 
stakeholders could address the economic challenges 
facing the country and seek consensus on their 
resolution principally during the transition and 
potentially thereafter. It has subsequently been 
replaced by the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) which includes organisations 
of community development interests, in addition to the 
interests represented on the NEF. 
6 page 1 of the Report 
The rounds of negotiations referred to in the Report are 
those mentioned earlier.7 They are aimed at breaking down 
barriers to trade through a process of negotiating the 
outlawing of such barriers as well as by negotiating the 
reduction of tariffs generally. The attainment of free 
trade and free competition are seen to be the goals of the 
GATT with the ultimate goal being the achievement of zero-
tariff protection. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these are the stated ultimate 
aims of the GATT, the participants to the various rounds of 
negotiations have recognised that there are certain common 
international trade practices which could potentially be 
harmful to international trade as a whole. Two important 
manifestations of these practices are: firstly, the use of 
predatory pricing and secondly, the use of subsidies. It is 
believed, by the participants to the GATT, that where the 
use of these practices exceed the bounds of fair 
competition, to such an extent that local industries are not 
able to meet the competition through their own resources, a 
distortion in international trade may very well result and 
that this situation would be counter-productive to the aims 
of the GATT. Cassim8 points out that "A fundamental 
contradiction of the GATT, or the free-trade ethos it 
advocates, is the diverse way in which countries have 
resorted to protective measures, specifically in the 1970s 
and 1980s, other than through conventional tariff 
mechanisms." 
As a result of the recognition that potentially harmful 
international trade practices do exist, certain remedies 
against these practices were devised in the form of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties. These remedies are, 
however, subject to very strict negotiated guide-lines. 
These strict guide-lines are considered necessary so as to 
ensure that the objective of free international trade is not 
frustrated as it is generally agreed that, in practice, a 
substantial amount of international trade occurs at dumped 
prices. 
The latest round of the GATT negotiations, which commenced 
in 1986, is commonly known as the Uruguay Round. This Round 
represents an attempt by the members of GATT to deal with 
important international trade issues including: trade in 
agriculture; rapidly growing trade in other fields such as 
transfer of skills, technology and services; expansion of 
intra-firm trade and non-tariff barriers. The Uruguay Round 
found South Africa being placed under a substantial amount 
of pressure by its major trading partners to comply with the 
GATT requirements. In effect South Africa had to start 
opening up its markets to the international trading 
7@ page 1 
8 supra 
community or be faced with retaliatory measures. As the 
majority of the most important trading partners South Africa 
has are member states to the GATT, any retaliatory measures 
taken by them could have drastic consequences for the South 
African economy. The extent of the pressure that was placed 
upon South Africa, amongst other countries, can be seen in 
this statement by the NEF in its Report: 
"In terms of South Africa's obligations under the GATT, 
entered into by the majority of countries trading 
internationally, a number of customs duties applicable 
to certain products in ... Schedule [1 to the Customs 
and Excise Act] are bound against increases above 
specified levels. There is continuous pressure 
throughout the world, by the contracting parties to 
GATT, on all countries, including the Customs Union 
partners, to increase the number of bindings and also 
to lower the levels of protection afforded their 
industries by way of customs duties."9 
It is perhaps a direct result of this increased pressure on 
South Africa to comply with the requirements of the GATT, or 
face retaliatory measures, that has brought about the 
seemingly sudden change in attitude that South Africa has 
displayed, regarding the role it sees international trade 
playing in its economy. 
South Africa immediately became a signatory member to the 
results of the Uruguay Round. It did so, however, with the 
signature of the previous government. This left open the 
question as to whether the current government feels itself 
bound by the principles agreed on in the Uruguay Round or 
not. It soon became clear that the principles outlined by 
the Uruguay Round were also embraced by the ANCl0-led 
Government of National Unity, which was elected in April 
1994, and which has subsequently confirmed South Africa's 
commitment to the GATT and its principles. 
This commitment to the GATT and its principles was 
reinforced when, during December 1994, the South African 
Government of National Unity lodged with the GATT-
Secretariat a signed instrument of accession to the 
Agreement which established the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). In doing so South Africa became a member of the WTO 
and a party to the multilateral agreements concluded in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The Agreement 
establishing the WTO envisages a single institutional 
framework encompassing the GATT, as modified by the Uruguay 
Round, all agreements and arrangements concluded under its 
auspices and the complete results of the Uruguay Round. The 
WTO framework is aimed at ensuring a 'single undertaking 
4 ibid 
10 African National Congress 
approach' to the results of the Uruguay Round and as a 
result, membership in the WTO will entail accepting all the 
results of the Round without exception. 
Included in the multilateral agreements is the Agreement on 
the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT which relates 
to dumping. This agreement is known as the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, The Uruguay Round 
Anti-Dumping Code. The GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement was ' 
initially concluded at the end of the Tokyo Round of 
Negotiations. The Code that came out of the Uruguay Round 
is a revision of this Agreement. 
The accession to the WTO was approved by Parliament during 
April 1995, on the recommendation of both houses of 
Parliament, and in accordance with the. provisions of the 
Interim Constitution of South Africall. The question 
remains, however, whether the agreements that fall under the 
WTO form part of the domestic law of South Africa. Section 
231 of the Interim Constitution, regarding the Continuation 
of International Agreements and the Status of International 
Law, .Provides in Subsection 3 that: 
"Where Parliament agrees to the ratification of or 
accession to an international agreement under 
subsection (2), such international agreement shall be 
binding on the Republic and shall form part of the law 
of the Republic, provided Parliament expressly so 
provides and such agreement is not inconsistent with 
this Constitution." 
As Parliament has not passed an Act expressly incorporating 
the provisions of the WTO into South Africa's domestic law, 
as is required by the Interim Constitution, the agreements 
that form the substance of the WTO cannot, therefore, be 
invoked by citizens against the Government. The agreements 
that comprise the WTO, therefore remain in the public law 
sphere are consequently only binding on the member states to 
the WTO. 
THE GATT REGARDING ANTI-DUMPING 
The GATT itself provides for anti-dumping mechanisms in 
Article VI. Dumping is described in Article VI ( 1) which 
provides that: 
" ... dumping, by which products of one country are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at 
less than the normal value of the products, is to be 
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to 
an established industry ... or materially retards the 
establishment of a domestic industry." 
11 Act 200 of 1993 
The same Article then goes on to define when a product is to 
be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an 
importing country at less than its normal value. This is 
stated as occurring when the price of the product exported 
from one country to another: 
"(a)is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary 
course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country; 
or 
(b)in the absence of such domestic price, is less 
than either 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like 
product for export to any third 
country in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the 
country of origin plus a reasonable addition for 
selling cost and profit." 
The term 'like product' is used frequently in this Article~ 
In practice this term can be most significant as the 
domestic products that are affected by dumping are not 
always identical to the imported product. The use of this 
term suggests that not only identical products but also 
products which are not identical but which have similar 
characteristics are relevant regarding a determination of 
dumping. 
In practice goods are not always imported directly from the 
country in which they are produced (the country of origin). 
It can happen that they are imported via another country. 
When this occurs, in terms of this Article, the price in the 
country of export is used in order to provide the normal 
price. There are certain exceptions to this situation 
however: firstly, if the products were not manufactured in 
the country of export; secondly if there is no comparable 
price for the products in that country; and lastly if the 
products were merely trans-shipped through a second country. 
In terms of these exceptions a comparison with the price of 
the country of origin is permitted.12 
Article VI(2) goes on to provide that in order to offset or 
prevent dumping: 
"A contracting party may levy on any dumped product an 
anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the 
margin of dumping in respect of such product." 
The prices must at every stage be compared at the same level 
of trade and in respect of sales made (as nearly as 
possible) the same time. Differences which may affect price 
12 Van Routte supra@ page 95 
comparability are allowed for. These may include 
differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, deeds 
of trade, quantities and physical characteristics. The term 
'dumping margin' refers to the difference between the price 
at importation and the higher price in the country of 
origin.13 
Article VI ( 6) (a) provides, further, that "No contracting 
party shall levy any anti-dumping duty on the 
importation of any product of another contracting party 
unless it determines that the ef feet of the dumping . . . is 
such as to cause or threaten material injury to an 
established domestic industry, or is such as to retard 
materially the establishment of a domestic industry." 
In terms of this provision it is clear that "[d]umping is 
only prohibited under the GATT when it causes material 
injury to a domestic industry, when it causes a threat of 
such injury or when it causes material retardation of the 
establishment of a new domestic industry. This injury must 
be established on foot of an objective examination as to the 
volume of the dumped goods and their effect on the price of 
like products on the local market, as well as on the local 
industry of said products .... Only injury caused by dumping 
itself is considered, not injury that can be attributed to 
other factors."14 
It is these provisions of the GATT that provide the basis of 
anti-dumping law. These provisions acknowledge the 
existence of the practice of dumping and provide for the 
remedy that may be sought in the event that dumping occurs 
provided certain requirements are met. Van Houtte points 
out that "[d]umping is carried out by enterprises. However, 
the rules of the GATT are not directed at enterprises, but 
exclusively at the contracting states, which are responsible 
for the transposition of the GATT anti-dumping rules into 
national law."15 
ANTI-DUMPING CODE 
The principles on dumping are rather simply provided for in 
Article VI. This Article has, however, been extensively 
amplified by the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Code (1994) 
which replaced the earlier Anti-dumping Code (1979). South 
Africa is not yet a signatory to this Code, however when it 
became a signatory to the WTO, as the Anti-Dumping Code, 
forms part of the agreements under the WTO, South Africa 
has to, effectively, take its provisions into account. 
13 ibid 
14 ibid 
15 supra@ page 94 
i 
The Code is very important as it deals with many of the 
practical aspects of a dumping investigation as well as 
issues regarding the imposition of an anti-dumping duty. It 
has given greater clarity and has provided more detailed 
rules concerning the method of determining that a product is 
dumped. 
Included in the issues covered by the Code are the 
following: the determination of the precise margin of 
dumping (which is vital in fixing the duty which may legally 
be applied); the definition of domestic industry; the 
question of evidence and provisional measures which may be 
taken. Other important items covered by the Code are the 
procedures which are to be followed when initiating and 
conducting anti-dumping investigations as well as the 
implementation and duration of any anti-dumping measures 
that are taken. 
The role of dispute settlement panels, in disputes relating 
to anti-dumping actions taken by domestic authorities, is 
also covered.16 When a dispute arises the states must first 
discuss the issue amongst themselves. If this process does. 
not provide a solution the 'Committee on Anti-dumping' 
practices'17 will attempt a conciliation. The Anti-dumping 
Code requests the states to show "sympathetic consideration" 
for the points of view of other states. If conciliation 
proves to be impossible, the Committee shall then convene a 
Panel. This Panel acts within the general GATT Integrated 
Dispute Settlement Procedure.18 These procedures could 
prove to be very important at an international level in 
ensuring that the various signatories adhere to the GATT 
requirements regarding anti-dumping procedures and in this 
way they may contribute towards the general GATT aim of 
ensuring free and fair trade between countries. 
Regarding the methodology for determining that a product is 
exported at a dumped price, the Code adds relatively 
specific provisions on such issues as criteria for 
allocating costs when the export price is compared with a 
'constructed' normal value and rules to ensure that a fair 
comparison is made between the export price and the normal 
value of a product so as not to arbitrarily create or 
inflate margins of dumping.19 
16 in Article 15 of the Code. This Article essentially 
provides that parties should complete the dispute 
settlement procedures under this Code, should disputes 
arise between them regarding rights and obligations 
under this Code, before availing themselves of any 
rights which they have under the GATT. 
17 where the states confer with each other on inter alia 
provisional and final anti-dumping measures 
18 Van Routte supra@ page 96 
19 Article 2 of the Code 
The Code strengthens the requirement for the importing 
country to establish a clear causal relationship between the 
dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry. 20 
The examination of the dumped imports on the industry 
concerned must include an evaluation of all the relevant 
economic factors bearing on the state of the industry 
concerned. 
Further, the Code confirms the existing interpretation of 
the term 'domestic industry'. 21 Subject to a few 
exceptions, 'domestic industry' refers to the "domestic 
producers as the whole of the like products or to those of 
them whose collective output of the products constitutes a 
major proportion of the total domestic production of those 
products".22 
A significant improvement over the previous Agreement is 
provided by the addition of a new prov1.s1.on in terms of 
which anti-dumping measures shall expire five years after 
the date of imposition, unless a determination is made that, 
in the event of the termination of the measures, dumping and, 
injury would be likely to continue or recur.23 Further, it 
is provided that where provisional measures are taken to 
prevent injury, in the form of provisional anti-dumping 
duties or security for estimated anti-dumping duties, these 
provisional measures can only apply for four (and in 
exceptional cases six) months.24 
Another new provision requires the immediate termination of 
an anti-dumping investigation in cases where the authorities 
determine that the margin of dumping is de minimus (this is 
defined as being less than 2%, expressed as a percentage of 
the export price of the product) or where the volume. of 
dumped imports is negligible ( generally when the volume of 
dumped imports from an individual country accounts for less 
than 3% of the imports of the product in question into the 
importing country).25 
The Code also calls for prompt and detailed notification of 
all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions to a 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. The Code affords the 
affected parties the opportunity for consultation on any 
matter relating to· the operation of the Code or the 
furtherance of its objectives.26 
20 Article 3 of the Code 
21 Article 4 of the Code 
22 Van Houtte supra @ page 95 
23 Article 9 of the Code 
24 Van Houtte supra @ page 96 
25 Article 5 of the Code 
26 Articles 15 and 16 of the Code. 
Very importantly the Code also calls, in Article 16, 
Paragraph 6, for all governments which accept or accede to 
it to take "all necessary steps, of a general or particular 
pharacter, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the 
provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for the Party 
in question." 
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN AN 
ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As will be seen, it has generally been recognised that the 
current South African legislation, regarding dumping, will 
have to be substantially amended and that these amendments 
are, in fact, imminent. The following comments must be seen 
in the light of this fact. Providing an outline, of the 
current mechanisms used in anti-dumping investigations, is 
further complicated by the fact that South Africa does not 
have the necessary legislative framework, case law or 
experience. 
The Custom's and Excise Act27, ( the Customs Act) provides 
for the current anti-dumping legislation in South Africa and 
has done so for several decades. There have, however, been 
very few anti-dumping investigation before 1992. This 
scarcity in anti-dumping investigations has largely been a 
result of the fact that South African producers were able to 
use other mechanisms, that were on the whole far more 
effective, in order to achieve the same (if not better) 
results. These more effective mechanisms included the use 
of formula duties28, import controls, and ad hoc 
applications for increases in duties. 
These mechanisms are, however, not 'legal' in terms of the 
GATT and have, therefore, for the most part been dismantled 
as South Africa moves in the direction of complying with the 
GATT requirements. As these earlier mechanisms have largely 
been dismantled, and as they are currently in the process of 
being replaced by mechanisms that are 'GATT-friendly', anti-' 
dumping measures have become very important for local 
producers as these measures are generally perceived to be 
27 Act 91 of 1964 
28 A formula duty is an amount, in Rands, per unit of 
quantity (the reference price) less a percentage ad 
valorem on the export price. In most instances the 
effect of such a formula is, where the export price of 
any consignment is less than the reference price, the 
duty will be equal to the normal ad valorem duty on 
that export price, plus the full amount of the 
difference between the reference price and the export 
price. Therefore, in effect, the lower the price, the 
higher the duty. 
the only remedy available to them as they face the threat of 
increasing numbers of low-priced imports. As the South 
African market opens up to international trade, and as 
tariffs are progressively being lowered, by the Government, 
in order to comply with the GATT requirements regarding 
tariff bindings, South African producers feel that they are 
under attack from several directions at once. 
New anti-dumping legislation was introduced in South Africa 
during May 1992, in the form of amendments to the Board of 
Trade and Industry Act ( the Board Act) 29, and the Customs 
Act. When these amendments were introduced various concerns 
were expressed by people involved in South African industry. 
It was generally recognised that the amendments were 
contrary to the GATT and that they gave the Board an 
extremely wide discretion.30 These amendments substantially 
narrowed the object of the renamed 'Board on Tariffs and 
Trade' and increased emphasis was placed on the 
investigation of dumping, the use of subsidies and a new 
concept of 'disruptive competition' was introduced. 
Disruptive competition is defined in the Act as the "export 
or proposed export of goods to the Republic or the common 
customs area of the Southern African customs Union, other 
than dumping or subsidized export, in quantities and under 
circumstances which cause or may cause material injury to 
established industries in the Republic or the common customs 
area of the Southern African Customs Union or which may 
retard the establishment of industries in the Republic or 
the common customs area of the Southern African Customs 
Union."31 It is not entirely clear whether this concept of 
disruptive competition falls within the provisions of · the 
GATT. The NEF suggests that the wording 'disruptive 
competition' is too wide and needs to be changed to 
'disruptive export' .32 
The Board is a statutory body established in terms of the 
Board Act with the Board members being appointed by the 
State President on the basis of their knowledge and 
expertise in commerce, industry and the economy. 33 This 
appointment of members to the Board from such a wide variety 
of fields shows a recognition of the broader issues that are 
involved in international trade matters and the importance 
of including members who are able to take these issues into 
account. At present the full-time members form a 
'management committee', which meets on a weekly basis. The 
29 Now renamed the Board on Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 
1986 
30 'Anti-dumping Law and Practice in South Africa' by Leora 
Blumberg@ page 2 
31 Section 1 of the Board Act 
32 supra@ page 23 
33 Section 5 of the Board Act 
full Board meets on a monthly basis and, aside from dealing 
with other matters, reviews the decisions of the 
commit tee. 3 4 The actual day to day work of the Board is 
performed by r)fficers, or employees, of the Department of 
Trade and Industry designated for that purpose by the 
Director-General of Trade and Industry. The authorised staff 
component consists of a director plus secretary, three 
deputy directors and six investigating officers ranging from 
Assistant Trade and Industry Adviser to Assistant Director. 
The NEF suggests that "additional staff will need to be 
trained in the very near future to cope with the expected 
inflow of work resulting from the Gatt commitments. The 
retraining of the existing staff already designated for the 
work incidental to the Board's function should receive 
priority. As the existing staff is experienced in Customs 
tariff investigations their re-training to undertake 
investigations of alleged unfair international trade 
practices should not be a problem." 35 It would seem that, 
with the increased emphasis that is being placed on anti-
dumping investigations, in particular, and unfair trade 
practices, in general, this projection is probably correct. 
Section 3 of the Board Act outlines the objects of the Board 
and provides that they are "to promote industrial growth 
within the framework of the economic policy of the Republic 
by conducting investigations into any matter which affects 
or may affect the trade and industry of the Republic or the 
common customs area of the Southern African Customs Union, 
and to advise the Minister in this regard." The fact that 
the Board is empowered to conduct investigations, within the 
'framework of the economic policy of the Republic' is 
significant in that it is the change in the economic policy 
of the Republic that has resulted in increased emphasis 
being placed on concerns such as dumping. 
For this purpose, and in terms of the Board Act, the Board 
may investigate dumping, of its own accord, in or to the 
republic and, if authorised thereto by an agreement, in or 
to the common customs area of the Southern African Customs 
Union36 (SACU). The Board may also, by order of the Trade 
Minister, investigate any other matter which affects or may 
affect the trade and industry of the Republic and, if 
authorised thereto by an agreement, the common customs area 
of the SACU. 3 7 At the moment, however, the other Customs 
Union members do not see the Board as 'their' body as they 
do not have any direct representation on it. Be that as it 
may, they are obliged, through the Customs Union Agreement, 
to apply the tariff measures resulting from the Board's 
34 The NEF's Report supra@ page 16 
35 op cit@ page 18 
36 Section 4(l)(a)(i) of the Board Act 
37 Section 4(1)(a)(iii) of the Board Act 
recommendations. Since decisions by the Board affect the 
whole of the customs union area, consideration should be 
given to making the Board a truly representative customs 
union body.38 This is clearly an important aspect that will 
have to be addressed in the future. It is not only 
necessary that the Board be a more representative body in 
that the actual membership of the Board should be 
representative of the members of the SACO but the members of 
the SACO should also be able to provide input regarding the 
procedures of an anti-dumping mechanism as they will also be 
bound to impose any anti-dumping duties that the Board 
determines are necessary. 
The Board Act and the Customs Act legislate the basic' 
procedure which must be followed in an anti-dumping 
investigation. The Board is the body that must conduct the 
actual anti-dumping investigation and once this has been 
done the Board must then make a recommendation to the Trade 
Minister who may either accept or reject that 
recommendation.39 If the Trade Minister accepts the 
recommendation, the Trade Minister must then request the 
Minister of Finance to impose an anti-dumping duty and amend 
the tariff schedules accordingly.40 The Minister of Finance 
does this by referring the matter to the Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise to publish the amendment in the 
Government Gazette and to collect the relevant duties when 
they are payable. 
38 The NEF's Report supra@ page 17 
39 Section 4 of the Board Act 
40 Section 4(2) of the Board Act. The Minister of Finance 
may in terms of section 55(1) and (2), and acting in 
accordance with any request of the Minister of Trade, 
impose the anti-dumping requested by the amendment of 
Schedule 2. 
41 Whenever the Board publishes a notice in the Government 
Gazette that it is investigating the imposition.of an 
anti-dumping duty, the Commissioner of Customs and 
Excise shall in terms of Section 57A, by notice in the 
Government Gazette, impose a provisional payment in 
respect of the goods subject to an investigation if so 
requested by the Board. 
42 Section 57A(l) of the Customs Act 
43 Investigation into the alleged dumping of knitted acrylic 
jersey's, exported from the Republic of China and Korea 
(Board Report No. 3313); Investigation into the alleged 
dumping of hydrogen peroxide imported from, originating 
in or supplied by the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Italy (Board 
Report No. 3187) and the investigation into the alleged 
dumping of clear flat glass exported from the People's 
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Thailand and Singapore 
(Board Report No. 3408). 
It is the Minister of Finance who must be requested to amend 
the tariff schedule and impose the anti-dumping duty as the 
Department of Finance is the only Government department 
authorised to collect duties. The discretion of the 
Minister of Finance is in this way limited and his only real 
function is the imposition and collection of duties. 
However, in order for the Minister of Finance to make the 
necessary amendments regarding a final finding, the Minister 
needs to be provided with the necessary input from his 
Department, in particular from the Commissioner of Customs 
and Excise. It takes between one and three months from the 
date of the final finding by the Board to the date on which. 
the amendment is actually published in the Government' 
Gazette. As the period of validity of a provisional payment 
is specified in the international agreements, delays in 
reaching final findings and amendment of the relevant 
Schedule, has necessitated on various occasions the Board 
requesting the Commissioner for Customs and Excise to extend 
the validity of the provisional payment.47 Once the 
Minister of Finance has amended the relevant Schedule, as 
requested, this amendment is still subject to ratification 
thereof by Parliament at its next sitting. 
This situation is clearly not acceptable. A procedure, 
whereby the internationally agreed time limits can more 
easily be adhered to must be found. The NEF in its Report 
suggests that the current procedure can be "streamlined 
considerably by allowing the- Board to direct a request for 
amendment of Schedule 2 to the Customs Act directly to the 
Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance should be 
obliged to accede to this request and by presentation of the 
Board's report on the matter, by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, to parliament at its next session parliament can 
ratify the amendment."48 It would appear that this 
suggestion would present a way of dealing with the delays 
and should be considered when the current legislation is 
amended. 
When the Minister of 
tariff schedule, the 
Finance is requested to amend the 
schedule which must be amended is 
44 Investigation into the alleged dumping of titanium 
dioxide pigment imported from or originating in 
Australia (Board Report No. 3449). 
45 in the investigation into the alleged dumping of titanium 
dioxide pigment imported from or originating in 
Australia (Board Report No. 3449), the Board found that 
the provisional payment imposed was too high and that 
the definitive anti-dumping duty should be less than 
the provisional payment. 
46 Paragraph 34 of the Guide 
47 The NEF's Report supra@ page 13 
48 ibid 
Schedule 2 of the Customs Act. Section 55 ( 1) 49 provides 
that this Schedule specifies the goods which are, in 
addition to any other duty payable, liable to an anti-
dumping duty. 
In the past unfair trade practices were dealt with in terms 
of Schedule 1, of the Customs Act, which contains the 
permanent duties which are to be imposed on imported goods. 
As a result of South Africa striving to comply with the 
requirements of the GATT and as the GATT requires members to 
impose duties at an agreed level, this method is no longer 
practical. An anti-dumping duty which is imposed in terms 
of Schedule 1, as Schedule 1 relates to the permanent 
determination of tariffs, may very well amount to a breach 
of the requirements of the GATT. Unfair trade practices 
must, therefore, now be dealt with in terms of Schedule 2 
which is specific and temporary and as a result complies 
with the agreed GATT anti-dumping measures. Section 5650 
requires any amendment to be done by notice in the 
Government Gazette which is seen as a way of ensuring that 
any interested parties are informed. 
Certain exceptions to the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
are provided for in Section 55(5)51. This section provides 
that the Commissioner of Customs and Excise may "exempt from 
payment of any anti-dumping . . . duty, any goods which are 
imported in such circumstances or in such quantities that 
the importation of such goods does not, in his opinion, 
constitute regular importation of such goods for trade 
purposes." This suggests that goods which are imported for 
the purpose of being samples are exempt from the imposition 
of any anti-dumping duty. 
It is clear then that the real control in determining 
whether and to what extent an anti-dumping duty is to be 
imposed is given to Board, under the auspices of the 
Minister of Trade. This limitation of the discretion of the 
Minister of Finance was effected by the 1992 amendments and 
they seem to have been done with the intention of limiting 
the liability of the Minister of Finance. It would appear, 
however, that the legislature has not been entirely 
successful in this regard as the Minist~r of Finance is one 
of the named Respondents in the first Supreme Court review 
of an anti-dumping action.52 
49 of the Customs Act 
50 of the Customs Act 
51 ibid 
52 The unreported decision of Brenco Incorporated, FAG 
South Africa Limited, and Transnet Limited v The 
Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade, Minister of Trade 
and Industry and the Minister of Finance 
The Board Act, in Section 16A provides for the promulgation 
of regulations regarding: 
"(a) procedure in connection with any function of the 
Board; and 
(b) any other matter in connection with the 
achievement of the objects of the Board." 
Notwithstanding the fact that it would be very advantageous 
to be provided with regulations, for the purposes of 
defining the exact mechanisms of an anti-dumping 
investigation as well as the determination of the precise 
duty, none have yet been made. A Guide has, however, been 
published by the Board. This Guide refers, in rather 
general terms, to South Africa's obligations under the GATT 
and sets out the procedures that are to be adopted by the 
Board in an anti-dumping investigation. Some additional 
clarity has now been provided for but the Guide remains an 
internal document and has, therefore, no legal force. As a 
consequence additional problems may, in fact, have been 
created as applicants may find themselves relying on the 
contents of the Guide only to find that the Board has 
subsequently changed its approach. This could potentially 
involve extensive and unnecessary costs as the applicant 
could find itself in the position of having unwittingly 
followed the incorrect procedure and it would not be able to 
hold the Board to the contents of the Guide. 
The Guide also fails to deal with a number of detailed 
issues that arise in anti-dumping investigations, and which 
could seriously impact the outcome of any anti-dumping 
investigation. Presently these issues are left to the 
discretion of the Board officials. Companies involved in 
investigations are left stumbling about in the dark without 
knowing the rules of the game. This situation clearly does 
not enhance procedural fairness and certainty, and is 
clearly not acceptable in terms of the GATT. In practice, 
however, the Board has conducted its investigations 
generally in accordance with the procedure laid out in 
Article 5 of the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping Code.53 
Dumping is defined in Section 1 
occurring when goods are exported 
exported to South Africa -
of the Board Act as 
or are proposed to be 
II (a) at an export price lower than the price at which 
similar goods are being sold in the ordinary 
course of trade in the exporting country, for 
consumption there; 
53 op cit@ page 3 
(b) at an export price lower than the highest 
comparable price at which similar goods are being 
exported in the ordinary course of trade from the 
exporting country to any third country; 
(c) at an export price lower than the price which is 
made up as contemplated by subsection (2); or 
(d) at an export price lower than the comparable price 
at which similar goods are being exported to the 
Republic or the common customs area of the 
Southern African Customs Union from any other 
country;"54 
The first three parts of this definition (although far 
broader and less specific) are similar to the definition 
found in Article VI of the GATT . There exists, however, an' 
important difference between them in that in the South 
African definition the various categories are presented as 
alternatives whereas in the GATT definition they are to be 
applied to specific situations and in a particular sequence. 
The fourth category is further problematic in that it can 
quite clearly lead to absurd results. In terms of this part 
of the definition, dumping is proved to exist if the price 
of the imported products is lower than the price of other 
imports of a similar product from any other country. This 
part of the definition was said to be used only in the case 
of non-market economies. It has, however, been used in the 
investigation into the alleged dumping of printed bed-linen, 
imported from or originating in Pakistan. 55 It is most 
commonly used in investigations relating to products from 
the People's Republic of China. In practice the Board has 
interpreted the provisions in the Board Act as giving it the 
power to use any one of the four definitions in any 
investigation and it has done so in practice. Obviously 
dumping cannot be found to have occurred in this situation 
as it implies that whenever a competitive product is 
introduced into the South African market it is seen to be 
dumped and consequently an anti-dumping duty can be imposed. 
This would quite clearly be in the face of the requirements 
of the GATT. 
This definition of dumping has been amended, however, so as 
to bring it in line with the definition in the GATT and to 
do away with the absurd consequences of the fourth part of 
the current definition. It has been recognised, in the NEF 
Report that anti-dumping legislation and procedures must 
conform to the provisions of the GATT and the Uruguay Round 
Anti-dumping Code and that the existing legislation will 
have to be substantially amended. The amendments relating 
to the definition of 'dumping' did not in any way deal with 
the restructuring of the legislation or the institutions, 
54 Section 1 of the Board Act 
55 Board Report No. 3297 
and is generally considered to be an interim measure, 
pending a complete restructuring.56 
Paragraph 3 of the Guide provides that the Board will 
consider imposing an anti-dumping duty on an export where: 
"(a) such export is the cause of material injury to an 
industry in the Customs Union; or 
(b) the probability exists that material injury may be 
caused to an industry in the Customs Union by 
such export or the threat of such export; or 
(c) such export or the threat of such export 
materially retards or prevents the establishment 
and development of an industry in the Customs 
Union; and 
(d) such action is in the national interest."57 
In determining whether the requirements listed above have 
been complied with, the Board takes into account further 
factors such as: 
"(a) [the] actual and potential changes in output, 
sales, market share, profits, return on 
capital, productivity, capacity, utilisation, 
etc.; and 
(b) the actual or potential influence on cash flow, 
stocks, employment opportunities, wages, growth, 
ability to attract investments, ability to obtain 
capital, etc."58 
It is evident from the wording of Paragraph 3 that there is 
an 'injury requirement' which must be met. This 'injury 
requirement is generally seen to be a fundamental 
prerequisite for. the imposition of anti-dumping duties. 
This requirement was, however, removed from the Customs Act 
by the 1992 amendments and was not replaced by the Board act 
with the result that the only mention of it is to be found 
in Paragraph 3. It is provided in . the Guide that a 
determination of a threat of material injury is based on 
facts not merely on allegations, conjecture or remote 
possibility, and that the change in circumstances which 
would create a situation in which the dumping would cause 
material injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. It 
is also provided that for that the injury must be material 
in that the decline and the negative effects must be 
substantial to the point where the effected industry cannot 
combat the impact of the dumped imports from its own 
56 Leora Blumberg supra 
57 page 3 of the Guide 
58 page 2 of the Guide 
resources.59 The Board has dismissed several cases on the 
basis that there is no material injury.60 
These are by no means the only factors which the Board takes 
into account as, in order to impose a dumping duty, the 
Board must also consider whether any action taken will be in 
the 'National Interest'. When determining whether imposing 
an anti-dumping duty is in the 'National Interest', the 
Board contemplates, among other things, the following -
"(a) the benefits of competition to the local industry, 
as measured against the seriousness of the 
potential material injury to the industry; 
(b) the effect that material injury to the industry 
will have on its supplying and consuming 
industries; 
(c) the effect that any action may have on the growth 
and development of any other industry; 
(d) the ability of the industry to adjust to changing 
circumstances and the resulting time-span over 
which additional protection will have to be 
provided; 
(e) the extent to which consumers benefit from the low 
import prices and the extent to which these 
benefits are passed on; 
(f) the influence on employment and job opportunities; 
and 
(g) the influence on the balance of payments."61 
The question of whether a national interest clause should be 
included in the legislation is one that has been debated at 
length internationally. If no national interest clause is 
included, the investigating body will be obliged to 
introduce the duty even when the industry that is being 
protected is of dubious worth to the economy. The inclusion 
of a clause on national interest could, however, lead to a 
situation where a deserving case is not assisted as a result 
of 'political' pressure. 
The concept of 'national interest' was introduced into the 
earlier legislation. Initially the concept was applied in a 
59 Leora Blumberg supra@ page 7 
60 Investigation into the alleged dumping of unmodified 
starches from or originating in Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland 
and Thailand (Board Report No. 3486); Investigation 
into the alleged dumping of semi-refined paraffin wax 
imported or originating in the People's Republic of 
China and Hong Kong (Board Report No. 3492); 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of clay pigeon 
targets imported from or originating in France (Board 
Report No. 3384) 
61 op cit 
protectionist manner. The policy of import replacement and 
factors such as the creation and maintenance of job 
opportunities were very dominant. There is a general 
concern that the concept of 'national interest' may be used 
by smaller undertakings, within an industry, in an attempt 
to protect themselves against an alleged unfair 
international trade practice. The Uruguay Round Anti-
dumping Code, however, clearly defines a 'domestic industry' 
as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the 
like products or to those of them whose collective output of 
the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those product and as a result, the 
interests of smaller undertakings, as opposed to those of 
the industry as a whole, should not be used in an anti-
dumping investigation. 
Using criteria such as the protection of jobs and the 
creation of captive markets for South African product inputs 
renders action against an alleged unfair international trade 
practice nothing more than a protectionist measure. This 
would be in the face of the stated aims of the GATT and 
therefore could not be tolerated in terms of the GATT 
requirements. It is as a result of these concerns that the 
NEF in its Report suggests that "the consideration of 
'national interest' best be left out of the equation."62 
The fact that the Board currently may take certain factors 
regarding 'national interest', such as those outlined above, 
into account give substance to the concerns raised by the 
NEF. These factors could easily be abused in order to 
prevent alleged unfair international trade practices and 
this would certainly amount to a contravention of the GATT 
requirements. Whilst it necessary for South African 
producers to have mechanisms available to them that prevent 
unfair international trade practices, the emphasis should be 
place on the unfairness of the practice. If factors, such 
as those currently outlined, are permitted to be taken into 
account the Board could, in theory, prevent international 
trade practices or take action against them despite the fact 
that they are not unfair. 
The process does not end here, however, as having determined 
that injury has, in fact, occurred the Board must still 
determine whether that injury was caused by dumping, and not 
by some other factor. In Paragraph 6 of the Guide the 
elements that are considered in this part of the 
determination are laid out and these are: 
"(a) the volume of all relevant imports from all 
countries, existing tariffs and rebate provisions; 
(b) the impact of imports and their prices on the 
domestic market; and 
62 supra@ page 26 
(c) factors such as political influences; the state of 
the economy; labour matters; boycotts; product 
quality and range; delivery periods; the 
technology employed; the utilisation of production 
factors; and the policies of the industry 
concerning production, marketing and finance."63 
It is clear, therefore, that there is a stringent causality 
requirement that must be proved when determining whether an 
anti-dumping duty should be imposed. The relevant 
legislation does not mention this requirement and once again 
the only reference to it is to be found in the Guide. This 
causality requirement is of particular relevance to the 
South African situation. It may very well prove to be the 
undoing of many an application for an anti-dumping duty to 
be imposed. There are several reasons why locally produced 
products may suffer in the face of competition provided by 
imported products. These factors can be seen to be more a 
repercussion of the previous isolation of the South African 
economy and its protectionist past than as a result of the 
fact that products are being dumped. An economy that is 
protectionist in nature will result in products continuing 
to survive in a domestic market despite the fact that the 
producers are not using their resources effectively. The 
very weak South African exchange rate is another factor 
which may result in local products not being able to compete 
in an international market. Issues such as the low 
productivity rate in South Africa may also contribute to: 
South African products not being able to compete 
successfully with imported products. 
In the light of these other factors, therefore, it would 
seem that a very good indication as to whether injury in a 
domestic market is caused by the importation of competitive 
products, or whether it is caused by any other factors, is 
to determine whether the local manufacturer is exporting its 
product. It is generally accepted that in the current 
economic climate it is very desirable to be exporting your 
product, therefore if a local manufacturer is not doing so 
this fact could be used to provide a very good indication 
that their product is, firstly, not competitive and, 
secondly, that the local producer is not using their 
resources effectively. 
In this regard the NEF, in its Report, suggests that when a 
domestic industry can no longer compete with imports at 
.normal prices, "the domestic industry should, in such cases 
endeavour to improve its efficiency through structural 
adjustment or other measures in order to be able to compete. 
It is recognised that it might take time to implement such 
structural adjustment and a remedy in the form of safeguard 
measures were therefore negotiated. The purpose of the 
63 page 2 of the Guide 0 
safeguard is to allow a country to exceed the binding in 
respect of a tariff item for a temporary period of time in 
order to allow the domestic industry to effect structural 
adjustment."64 
It is clear, therefore, that the limitations of anti-dumping 
mechanisms in the South African context are fully 
recognised, however it is just as apparent that any 
safeguard measures that have been negotiated for the time-
being will not always be available and that South African 
producers will have to ensure that their products are 
competitive in an international market in order to 
effectively utilise the anti-dumping measures. 
Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa will be able to 
use temporary safeguard measures, the timef rame envisaged 
for the removal of these safeguard measures is unlikely to 
give South African manufacturers sufficient time in which to 
comprehensively implement the structural adjustment 
procedures as suggested by the NEF. This is a very real 
concern for South African producers and once again goes to 
highlight the significance of effective and accessible anti-
dumping procedures for South African producers. 
Section 4 ( 1) (a) ( i) of the Board Act provides that "... the 
Board may - of its own accord investigate dumping .... 11 It 
is quite clear, however, that this is not the only way in, 
which the Board can investigate dumping as the Guide 
provides in Paragraph 12 that: 
"An investigation by the Board to determine the 
existence, degree and effect of any alleged unfair 
trade practice ... may be initiated by way of a 
written application on a questionnaire prescribed by 
the board, requesting such an investigation by or on 
behalf of the industry concerned."65 
It is self-evident, therefore, that a large amount of scope 
is given to local manufacturers in order that they may 
petition the Board to make an investigation, either by 
motivating the industry concerned to do so on their behalf, 
or by doing so themselves on behalf of the local industry. 
In this way any local industry is afforded the opportunity 
of being pro-active when facing the importation of 
potentially dumped products. Another advantage of 
permitting local manufacturers to petition the Board is that 
any application brought by or on behalf of a local industry 
will have a fair amount of impetus as such an application 
will have the backing of the entire industry affected. 
However, the lodging of an application with the Board is no 
guarantee that the Board will embark on the investigation as 
there are certain prescribed requirements that first have to 
64 page 3 of the Report 
65 page 4 of the Guide 
be met before the Board will consider initiating an entire 
investigation. 
These requirements that first have to be met are spelt out 
in Paragraph 13 of the Guide which states that: 
"Such application must include evidence of -
(a) dumping ... benefiting the exported product; 
(b) material injury or the threat thereof to the 
industry concerned; and 
(c) a causal link between the alleged particular 
unfair trade practice concerned and the alleged 
material injury."66 
It would seem that, in terms of the requirements laid out in 
Paragraph 13, a prime f acie case has to be made, by the 
applicant, before the Board will seriously consider 
investigating an alleged unfair trade practice. The 
conclusion that a prima facie case has to be made by the 
applicant is reinforced by the contents of Paragraph 14 
which emphasizes this by stating that 11 [m]ere assertion, 
unsubstantiated by the relevant evidence, will not be 
considered sufficient reason for the ,initiation of an 
investigation."67 
When an applicant brings an application to the Board, and 
that applicant requires assistance in completing the 
prescribed questionnaire, that applicant may approach the 
Board in this regard. 68 The NEF points out that this 
11 [a]ssistance can be provided by [the] Liaison Unit [which] 
still does not exist due to lack of staff 11 • 69 That this 
Liaison Unit does not yet exist is very worrying as the 
entire process of bringing an application to the Board is 
extremely complicated and is furthermore of a technical 
nature. The fact that provision has been made for the 
creation of a Liaison Unit indicates that the Board 
recognises that a need exists for such a unit. In effect 
the lack of such a unit possibly has resulted in fewer 
applicants being successful in their applications as a 
result of the fact that they are unable to deal with the 
process effectively. The NEF suggests that 11 [t]he private 
sector should be provided with assistance to complete 
petitions. This function should, however be completely 
divorced from the investigative work in order to ensure 
complete neutrality on the part of the investigation 
personnel."70 
66 ibid 
67 op cit@ 5 
68 Paragraph 15, page 5 of the Guide 
69 page 7 of the Report 
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Paragraph 16 of the Guide specifies the information which 
must be supplied in support of an application and states 
that it must be such information which is reasonably 
available to the applicant on the following: 
"(a) The identity of the applicant and details of the 
volume and value of production of the like product 
by the applicant. 
(b) Where application is made on behalf of an 
industry, the identity of the industry on behalf 
of which the application is made and a list of all 
known producers of the like product plus, to the 
extent possible, details of the volume and value 
of domestic production of the like product 
accounted for by each producer. 
(c) A complete description of the imported product; 
the names of the country or countries of export or 
origin of the product, the identity of each known 
exporter or foreign producer of the product and 
the identities of known importers of the product. 
(d) In respect of dumped products, information on 
prices at which the product in question is sold 
when destined for consumption in the domestic 
markets of the country or countries of origin or 
export or, where applicable, information on the 
prices at which the product is sold by the 
countries of origin for export to a third country 
or countries or the estimated cost of production 
in the country or countries of origin or export 
plus any other costs and profit deemed reasonable 
or, in the case of exports from a country without 
a free market economy, information in terms of any 
of the above three alternatives for any other 
country selected including the reasons for 
selecting the particular country."71 
From the extensive list of requirements outlined in 
Paragraph 16 it seems that a substantial onus is placed on 
the applicant to provide a formidable amount of information. 
Despite the fact that it is stated that the information 
which must be supplied is that which is reasonably 
accessible to the applicant, as the applicant is relying on 
this information in order to ensure a successful application 
it will have to do its utmost to provide the Board with as 
much of the requested information as possible. The 
information required is further of a nature that could only 
be obtained after extensive research is done into the 
product that is allegedly being dumped. It would seem, 
also, that some of this required information may be quite 
difficult for the applicant to find out, particularly in 
regard to the requirements specified in Paragraph 16(d), In 
order for an applicant to include such information in its 
71 page 5 of the Guide 
report it would most probably have to employ a specialist to 
undertake the research which could very well result in a 
fair amount of expense being incurred by the applicant. Any 
applicant, who is already suffering financially as a result 
of the importation of competitive products, may find the 
incurring of any additional expense problematic, especially 
in the light of the fact that there is still no guarantee 
that the application for the imposition of anti-dumping duty 
will be successful. 
Paragraphs 17 through to 20 outlines further requirements 
regarding information that must be supplied by the 
applicant. Paragraph 17 requires information to be supplied 
regarding the proof of 'material injury' and Paragraph 18 
requires information to be supplied regarding the proof of 
'the threat of material injury'. Paragraph 20 requires that 
" [ t] he information supplied must, where possible, be 
substantiated by documentary evidence".72 
Notwithstanding the fact that the placing of the onus onto 
the applicant may result in potential applicants chosing not 
to bring an application, this is probably the most effective 
way of ensuring that the Board only has to deal with 
applications that have a fairly good chance of succeeding. 
As it is envisaged that increasing numbers of applications 
will be brought to the Board and as a result the Board will 
have to deal with an increasingly heavy workload this could 
prove to be a very beneficial method of keeping this load to 
a minimum in the future. This is of even more importance 
when one considers the time pressures that are likely to be 
placed on the Board. 
The application procedure is very crucial especially as a 
result of the view, held by many local producers, that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties constitutes their only 
defence against an ever encroaching international market. 
The Board must ensure that the procedure used, when imposing 
an anti-dumping duty, are in line with the requirements of 
the GATT and as a result that certain standards are complied 
with. It is precisely these two potentially competing 
interests which must be taken into account by the Board that' 
make its work very problematic. 
Once the Board has received an application for an 
investigation into whether an anti-dumping duty must be 
imposed, the Board must asses the merits of the application. 
In doing so it must satisfy itself that there is sufficient 
evidence of an alleged unfair international trade practice, 
material injury or the threat thereof and that the latter is 
caused by the former to warrant an investigation. 7 3 The 
Board satisfies itself in this regard by examining the 
72 page 7 of the Guide 
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accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided by the 
applicant.74 
If the Board determines that the application does have 
merit, the application is then accepted and a formal 
investigation is initiated. However, the Board may also 
decide that the application does not have any merit and it 
must then inform the applicant to this effect. The 
applicant may then re-submit its application, together with 
additional information in order to further substantiate its 
allegations. 
Once the Board has decided to initiate a formal application, 
a general notice will be published in the Government 
Gazette. This notice must set out -
"(i) the name of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the product covered by the 
application; 
(iii) the countries of origin or export of the 
products in question; 
(iv) a summary of the evidence submitted to the Board; 
(v) the procedure to be followed; and 
(vi) the time limit for a response to the notice."75 
The Guide allows for a period of 30 days after receipt of 
the questionnaire for responses. Aside from this strict 
time limit, there seem to be no other time limits provided 
for. There has been no consistency in the time taken in 
investigations which has created a great deal of 
uncertainty. The time period from the date that the 
petition is lodged to the date that the investigation is 
actually initiated by notice in the Government Gazette has 
fluctuated from less than three weeks76 to almost eighteen 
weeks77 averaging at between two to three months. The 
investigation period, from the date of initiation in the 
Government Gazette to the date that the final decision is 
implemented in the Government Gazette has fluctuated from 98 
days78 to 581 days79. Whilst the period taken has been 
acceptable in certain of the investigations, there are a 
number of investigations where the period has far exceeded' 
74 Paragraph 21, page 7 of the Guide 
75 Paragraph 22 ibid 
76 Investigation into alleged dumping of laundry drying 
machines from Australia (Board Report No. 3231) 
77 Investigation into the alleged dumping of adhesive 
sanitary pads imported from or originating in Hungary, 
initiated in August 1995. 
78 Investigation into the alleged dumping of laundry drying 
machines from Australia (see above). 
79 Investigation into the alleged dumping of knitted acrylic 
jerseys, exported from the Republic of China and Korea 
(Board Report No. 3313). 
that required in Article 5 .10 of the Uruguay Round Anti-
dumping Code.BO 
Interested parties are also invited to make submissions 
regarding the anti-dumping investigation. Interested 
parties would include consumer organisations as well as any 
individuals, corporate entities or trade or business 
associations likely to be affected by an anti-dumping 
investigation. The Guide also provides that the Board may 
hold public hearings where interested parties may submit 
evidence in connection with the allegation of dumping.Bl 
In its report, the NEF looked at the actual modus operandi 
of the Board. It found that the governments of the 
exporting countries are also informed of the fact that an 
investigation is being undertaken regarding specific 
products being exported from their country. The Board 
provides the concerned governments, all known importers and 
exporters with questionnaires which they must complete. 
These parties are all required to provide the Board with any 
non-confidential information that they consider to be 
relevant to the investigation and which they believe will 
amount to their version regarding the application. The 
Board then sets about determining whether the requested 
information, provided by the interested parties, is correct 
by visiting the parties and conducting an investigation 
pertaining to the information that they have provided. In 
this regard the Board, where it is considered necessary, 
will travel abroad in order to visit the exporters and/or 
producers in the country of export/origin after permission 
has been obtained from such exporters, producers and from 
the government of the country concerned. If the parties do 
not co-operate, the Board will base its information on the 
best information available, that is the information 
submitted by the local producer. 
All the information that is collected and verified by the 
· Board is made available to all the interested parties on 
request, excluding any confidential information. 
In terms of Section 17 if the Board Act if a party indicates 
that information is confidential, the Board is not permitted 
to make the information available to the other party. That 
party must, however provide the Board with a non- . 
confidential summary which must be submitted simultaneously 
with the confidential information and which can be made 
available to the other interested parties. The prohibition 
against disclosure in the Board Act specifically excludes 
disclosure of information when required to do so by a court 
of law. This provision may not, therefore, be able to 
80 Leora Blumberg supra@ page 4 
81 Paragraph 27 of the Guide 
prevent disclosure of the information to a court of law, in 
terms of the normal rules of discovery or other Supreme 
Court procedures should the matter be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. An additional problem in relation to the use 
of confidential information is that, in terms of the rules 
of natural justice, which are applicable in administrative 
proceedings, a party is entitled to be in a position to 
properly answer the case against it. 
The Board is an administrative body with a wide discretion, 
it is clearly subject to the administrative law 
requirements. As a result, the basic principles of natural 
justice applicable as well as the provisions of Section 24 
of the Interim Constitution must be applied at all times. 
It does not appear as if the Board Act empowers the Board to. 
deviate from these well-established rule of natural justice.· 
Consequently, a failure to act in accordance with these 
rules will expose the Board to review proceedings by the 
Supreme Court. A court, in review proceedings, may find 
that the non-disclosure of confidential information amounts 
to a contravention of the rules of natural justice and 
therefore set the decision aside.82 
The need to take the rules of natural justice into account 
is further emphasised by Section 24(c) of the Interim 
Constitution which provides that where a government 
institution takes administrative action against a subject, 
that subject is entitled to full reasons for that action. 
As a result if a party is not provided with full reasons, as 
the decision is partly based on confidential information, 
the action may be set aside as being contrary to the 
requirements of the Interim Constitution. These procedural 
issues are being raised by lawyers in anti-dumping 
investigations and the Board is of necessity becoming more 
sensitive to them. 
A number of these procedural issues will be addressed in the 
first Supreme Court review of an anti-dumping case.83 These 
issues will have to be thoroughly addressed in the amendment 
of the legislation as the procedures created by the amended 
legislation will have to take into account procedural 
fairness in order to be consistent with the requirements of 
the Interim Constitution. 
In practice the Board does not play a pro-active role in the 
process of disclosure ( or non-disclosure) of information. 
It is stated in the Guide that information which has been 
indicated as being confidential without acceptable reasons 
therefor and not accompanied by non-confidential summaries 
thereof are not taken into consideration. Parties can and 
do, however, effectively withhold more information than is 
82 op cit@ page 5 
83 The Brenco case supra 
necessary from the other party, on the grounds of 
confidentiality, without any reaction from the Board.84 
The whole issue around confidentiality arises as a• result of 
the fact that the parties are required to provide the Board 
with a substantial amount of information regarding the way 
in which they conduct their business. It clearly may not 
always be in their best interests to do so. As a result of 
this, when the parties first bring an application to the 
Board, they are sensitive regarding the information they put 
in their application. Similarly, the respondents who 
believe they are facing competition from South African 
producers will be reluctant to place all their information 
in their reply. Consequently the Board can be faced with a 
formidable problem when it comes to determining the precise 
margin of dumping. 
The Board has recognised that this can present a problem and 
has provided for this by allowing parties to avoid placing 
information before the Board by making them an of fer in 
terms of which the very sensitive information will only be 
made available to the Board when it goes to verify the 
information provided at the actual factory or place of 
business of the foreign manufacturer. 
The uncertainty and lack of clarity, provided by the current 
situation, regarding the treatment of confidential 
information has and no doubt will continue to discourage 
parties from disclosing information to the Board. This 
clearly will have to be addressed in the near future. The 
requirements of Article 6 of the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping 
Code will also have to be taken into account in the amending 
of the legislation. 
The NEF recommends that a review and an appeal mechanism 
which protects confidential information, while 
simultaneously promoting transparency of proceedings must be 
built into the system. For this purpose the process to. 
arrive at a final determination must be split into two 
distinctly separate exercises. The first encompasses 
receipt of petitions for action against alleged unfair 
international trade practices, consideration of the petition 
(merit assessment), the actual investigation of allegations 
and counter arguments by professional staff, the 
consideration of the evidence by a body with the knowledge 
and expertise concerning the international rules 
( preliminary determination) and provisional measures where 
applicable. The second exercise consists of reviewing the 
preliminary determination using the same evidence and taking 
into consideration comments made by the parties concerned on 
the preliminary determination and making a final 
determination which, where applicable, 1·eads to 
84 ibid 
counteraction by way of amendment of Schedule 2 to the 
Customs Act. 
The body responsible for this review and the final 
determination must also attend to appeals against decisions 
made during the first exercise. This process will protect 
confidential information as it will limit law court actions 
to matters of procedure only.BS 
If the Board finds that all the requirements have been met, 
and that dumping has, in fact occurred, it must then 
determine a provisional duty which must be applied. In this 
regard the lesser of the dumping margin or the price 
disadvantage based on an unsuppresed selling price, in the 
South African market, is determined. This process is known 
as the 'lesser rule' . The Commissioner for · Customs and 
Excise is requested to impose a provisional payment in 
respect of the products involved, in the amount as 
de.termined in terms of the procedure outlined above. 86 
A final submission to the Board is prepared by the same 
staff that conducted the preliminary investigation. The 
final determination is then made by the Board. 
A report, consisting of the provisional determination and 
the final finding is submitted to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. If the Minister accepts the Board's 
recommendation and if that recommendation calls for a duty, 
the Minister requests the Minister of Finance to impose the 
duty, as outlined above. If, however, the Board's 
recommendation is a rejection and the Minister supports this 
recommendation, the parties are advised, the rejection is 
published in the Government Gazette and any provisional 
payments collected, are refunded. Should the Minister not 
accept the recommendations of the Board, the matter is then 
referred back to the Board. 
If the Minister accepts the Board's recommendation, and if 
the recommendation calls for a duty, he requests the Minster 
of Finance to impose the duty. The Uruguay Round Anti-
dumping Code provides that the amount of the anti-dumping 
duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping.87 It further 
provides, however, that it is desirable for the duty to be 
less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate 
to remove the injury to the domestic market. In the South 
African legislation there is no provision for a 'margin of 
dumping'. The Customs Act merely provides that the rate of 
the duty will be set in accordance with the request of the 
Minister of Trade. there is no mention of how this will be 
85 The NEF's Report supra@ page 14 
86 pages 8 and 9 of the Report 
87 Article 9.3 
calculated, nor whether it should ·bear any resemblance to 
the margin of dumping. The Guide does provide, however, 
that no anti-dumping duty shall exceed the margin of dumping 
but may be less if in the opinion of the Board, the lesser 
amount will be sufficient to remove the material injury. No 
mention is made as how the margin of dumping is to be 
determined. In this regard the amendments to the 
legislation will have to ensure that the minimum 
requirements of Article 9 of the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping 
Code are complied with. 
However should the recommendation be a rejection and should 
the minister accept the recommendation, the applicant can do 
nothing further. The NEF points out that the Act gives an 
unlimited discretion to the Board to conduct the 
investigations in the way that it sees fit. "There are no 
parameters for the exercising of powers by the [Board] or 
the Minister of Trade and Industry. "88 The NEF, in its 
Report, goes on to criticise the current mechanisms by 
pointing out that they do "not allow for inexpensive and 
acceptable review and appeal mechanisms outside formal legal 
proceedings through the law court system. Added to this is 
the fact that the law courts will express themselves only on 
procedures and not on economic evidence considered and the 
consideration thereof. Furthermore, there is, albeit 
remote, a possibility that with the law court's access to 
confidential (secret) business information this information 
might be "leaked" without any recourse by the injured party 
to the court."89 
These concerns expressed by the NEF are very valid, 
especially in the light of the importance of anti-dumping 
investigations to local producers. A local producer will 
feel particularly remediless, in the face of a rejection by 
the Board of an application for an anti-dumping 
investigation, if there is no appeal mechanism. This 
deficiency in further remedies together with the complicated 
nature of the application procedure itself could certainly 
lead to a situation where many local producers feel very 
hard done by. The fact that a local producer may use the 
review mechanisms of administrative law is of little 
consolation to an aggrieved applicant. 
Presently the only remedy available to an aggrieved party is 
review by the Supreme Court, based on the common law and 
Constitutional grounds of review, neither of which 
incorporates the merits of a decision. In the first Supreme 
Court review of an anti-dumping action90, the State Attorney 
raised a technical preliminary point. If this had been 
successful, decisions by the Board would, effectively, have 
88 page 9 of the Report. 
89 op cit@ 10 
90 The Brenco decision (see above). 
been ruled to be not reviewable. The point was, however, 
dismissed by the judge and judicial review in respect of 
anti-dumping investigations was confirmed. 
This is clearly another area which will have to be addressed 
when the current legislation is amended. This is recognised 
by Leora Blumberg who states that "it is hoped that in 
restructuring the legislation, serious consideration is 
given to the possibility of an automatic review of the 
merits of the case or an appeal procedure either to a 
separate administrative body, the Supreme Court, or to a 
specialised Trade Court."91 
Another problem presented by the current legislation and 
procedures is that there is no 'sunset' clause provided for 
either in the legislation or the Guide. The Customs Act 
provides that the Minister of Finance may, in accordance 
with any request by the Trade Minister from time to time by 
notice in the Government Gazette withdraw or reduce, with or 
without retrospective effect and to such an extent as may be 
specified in the notice, any anti-dumping duty previously 
imposed. 92 No specific time limit is provided for. The 
Guide provides that in the case of anti-dumping duties, the 
exporter(s) against whom the duty was instituted, 
representatives of the country/countries bf export/origin or 
any other person or organisation concerned with the relevant 
product may request that the matter be reinvestigated 
provided that twelve months has elapsed since the imposition 
of the duty.93 The Board will in each case decide whether 
such a reinvestigation is justified after a preliminary 
investigation of the request has been carried out. The 
Board may also, on its own initiative, at any time decide to 
reinvestigate an anti-dumping duty. The legislation and 
procedures in this regard will clearly also have to be 
addressed in the amendments to the legislation if it is to 
be in line with the requirements of the Uruguay Round Anti-
dumping Code.94 
There is no requirement in the legislation that parties need 
to be represented by lawyers in their dealings with the 
Board in any anti-dumping or other tariff matters. The 
Guide provides that should parties wish to be represented in 
an investigation they must the Board with a letter of 
appointment, detailing the identity of the representative 
91 supra@ page 9 
92 Section 56(2) 
93 Withdrawal of anti-dumping duties was recommended by the 
Board in respect of acetaminophenol imported from Hong 
Kong (Board Report No. 3187) and labels with woven 
inscriptions imported from or originating in Zimbabwe 
(Board Report No. 3476). 
94. In terms of Article 11 of the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping 
Code. 
and the scope of their representation. Historically South 
African parties have not used lawyers in their dealings with 
the Board. It is only since the legislation was amended in 
1992, that lawyers have started to play a role in anti-
dumping investigations. Prior to that the Board was seen as 
a powerful organisation with a wide discretion and open to 
lobbying groups, rather than as a legal forum. The basis of 
past representations were, therefore, more economic and 
political, rather than legal. The Board itself was not used 
to legal scrutiny, and for decades its decisions relating to 
tariff issues have gone unchallenged. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Board has in the past been insensitive 
to legal issues in anti-dumping procedures and initially 
resisted any involvement by lawyers.95 
There has been a fair amount of criticism directed against 
the Board by all the parties which are affected by the anti-
dumping legislation. While local producers feel that the 
anti-dumping legislation and procedures are not effective 
and that the Board does not show enough sensitivity towards 
their particular problems, foreign exporters and importers 
believe that the legislation is a new form of protectionism. 
The most serious problem experienced by all parties in the. 
implementation of the anti-dumping legislation, is the wide' 
discretion of the Board and the concomitant uncertainty and 
lack of transparency. 
More recently the Board has gained some experience and has 
developed its expertise in anti-dumping procedures. There 
is no doubt, however, that the South African legislation and 
procedure needs to be substantially overhauled in order to 
comply with the GATT and the Uruguay Anti-dumping Code.96 
The NEF in its Report, however, points out that "[t]he fact 
that a statutory body is responsible for the function of 
investigating unfair international trade practices is 
considered to be sound in that it can fulfil this function 
unbiased and without political or sectoral pressUre."97 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
It is in the light of these criticisms that the manner in 
which anti-dumping investigations are conducted in foreign 
jurisdictions becomes relevant. In the United. States of 
America dumping investigations are conducted by the Commerce 
department, while the International Trade Commission deals 
with injury determination. Each body operates independently 
with its own staff and budget. The International Trade 
Commission is a high powered statutory body, only answerable 
td the President of the USA. The total process is 
cumbersome and extremely expensive. Confidential 
95. Leora Blumberg supra @ page 5 
96 Leora Blumberg supra 
97 supra@ page 17 
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procedural aspects. Lawyers involved in anti-dumping cases 
have been propagating the concept of a court of first 
instance for anti-dumping cases.99 
It is interesting to note that the European Union faces 
similar problems regarding the review and appeal of anti-
dumping actions. Further the fact that the anti-dumping 
body is staffed by representatives of the member states is 
significant in the light of the fact that anti-dumping 
duties determined in South Africa are also applicable by the 
states that are members of the SACU. South Africa could 
consider doing something similar in this regard. 
In New Zealand anti-dumping investigations are conducted by 
the Department of Commerce (both the preliminary and final 
determinations). There are no provisions for appeal or; 
review by another body. 
The Australian procedure is quite different. The 
preliminary investigation is conducted by a special section 
of the Customs Service. The Anti-dumping Authority, a 
statutory body, conducts the final determination and also 
serves as an appeal body. A case that is rejected by the 
Customs Service can be appealed to the Anti-dumping 
Authority. The Authority does not undertake its own 
verifications and bases its determinations only on evidence 
that served before the Customs Service together with 
comments made by the parties concerned on the preliminary 
determination. As is the case in the European Union, the 
Australian Courts will rule on procedural aspects of the 
cases brought for review.100 
· The most significant conclusion that can be draw. from this 
brief comparison of the review and appeal mechanisms used by 
these different jurisdictions is that, despite the fact that 
all these countries to the principles of the GATT, they have 
all structured their investigative bodies differently to 
suit their own circumstances and needs. South Africa, when 
amending its current legiilation, should not, therefore feel 
bound to follow the procedures used by any one particular 
jurisdiction but should rather look at the circumstances and 
needs of those various jurisdictions and where they are 
relevant to the South African situation and thereby learn 
from other jurisdictions in this way. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1992 amendments, there has been a substantial 
increase in the number of applications that have been 
brought to the Board, with approx~mately 45 anti-dumping 
investigations actually being instituted. There can be 
99 op cit@ page 11 
100 ibid 
little doubt that with the changing trade policy in South 
Africa, the number of applications brought will continue to 
increase. A complete overhaul of the legislation and 
procedures is expected in the near future as it is quite 
clear that the Government recognises that these must change 
in order to comply with the GATT requirements. The question 
remains, however whether they will change in a way that is 
helpful for the local industries and the SACU. Clearly the 
interests of these two groups are of some concern for the 
Government. Any changes, however will have to be able to 
stand up to the most stringent international scrutiny if 
South Africa is not to face harsh retaliatory measures by 
its trading partners. Most of the important aspects that 
will have to be changed have been highlighted above and it 
will be interesting to see whether the new legislation takes 
them effectively into account. Only time will tell. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
'The Law of International Trade', Hans van Houtte, 1995, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 
'Anti-dumping and countervailing and safeguard measures' 
investigation by the Trade and Industry Working Group of the 
National Economic Forum - Unpublished 
'Anti-dumping law and practice in South Africa', Leora 
Blumberg, 1995 - Unpublished 
The Customs and Excise Act, No. 91 of 1964 
The Board on Tariffs and Trade Act, No. 107 of 1986 
The Guide - Action against unfair international trade 
practices: dumping, subsidies and other forms of disruptive 
competition, Board on Tariffs and Trade 
The Interim Constitution of South Africa Act, No. 200 of 
1993 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Brence Incorporated, FAG South Africa Limited and Transnet 
Limited v Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade, Minister of 
Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance, 1994, TPD .,;, 
Unreported 
The investigation into the alleged dumping of printed bed-
linen, imported from or originating in Pakistan (Board 
Report No. 3297) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of semi-refined 
paraffin wax imported from or originating in the People's 
Republic of China and Hong Kong (Board Report No. 3492) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of clay pigeon 
targets imported from or originating in France (Board Report 
No. 3384) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of hydrogen peroxide 
imported from, or originating in or supplied by the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic 
of Italy (Board Report No. 3187) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of clear flat glass 
exported from the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, 
Thailand and Singapore (Board Report No. 3408) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of titanium dioxide 
pigment imported from or originating in Australia ( Board 
Report No. 3449) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of acetaminophenol 
imported from Hong Kong (Board Report No. 3187) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of labels with woven 
inscriptions imported from or originating in Zimbabwe (Board 
Report No. 3476) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of unmodified 
starches exported from or originating in Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and 
Thailand (Boar~ Report No. 3486) 
~ 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of knitted acrylic 
jerseys, exported from the Republic of China and Korea 
(Board Report No. 3313) 
Investigation into the alleged dumping of laundry drying 
machines from Australia (Board Report No. 3231) 
